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Real Property Unrelated to Claim:




Since Shaffer v. Heiner, I the physical power test of quasi in rem
jurisdiction, derived from Pennoyer v. Neff' and its progeny, has
been supplanted by the "elastic standard"3 of the minimum contacts
test announced by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington 4 Portions of the Shaffer opinion unfurled the dormant
but undecided5 issue whether due process permits quasi in rem juris-
diction by attachment of defendant's real property not related to
plaintiff's claim. This article concludes that despite arguments to the
contrary, due process must be interpreted to preclude quasi in rem
jurisdiction over real property unrelated to the plaintiff's lawsuit.' A
different interpretation would clandestinely retain the power theory
'Assistant Professor, Western State University College of Law; B.A., University of Pitts-
burgh; J.D., California Western; LL.M., Columbia University.
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (states possess exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property
within their borders).
3. Commenting adversely upon the announcement of the "minimum contacts" test of in
personam jurisdiction, Justice Black reasoned that "[n]o one, not even those who most feared a
democratic government, ever formally proposed that courts should be given the power to in-
validate legislation [via fourteenth amendment due process clause] under any such elastic
standards." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
4. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
5. Shaffer dictates that the minimum contacts test normally applicable to in personam
jurisdiction, applies to allstate court assertions of jurisdiction, including quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion over intangibles with a statutory situs in the forum. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212
(1977). The Court reserved the issue whether mere presence of property suffices when no other
forum is available, however. Id at 211 n.37.
6. This article deals with jurisdictional utilization of real property that is not related to
the reason for plaintiff's lawsuit. No distinction is made among defendant's "ownership,"
"possession," "use" or similar possessory interests subject to the myriad of state statutory pro-
cedures for prejudgment attachment.
of jurisdiction, a result contrary to the current reasonableness stan-
dard enunciated in Shaffer.
II. Demise of the Physical Power Test
A. Historical Background of the Power Test.
In ancient Roman practice, foreign attachment proceedings7
were intended to provide a remedy against absentee defendants.8
This worthy rationale was observed in both medieval England9 and
its later American colonies."° The early American landmark case of
Pennoyer v. Nefft" solidified the doctrine that quasi in rem land at-
tachment was an appropriate remedy against nonresidents who
failed to satisfy their obligations, including obligations having no
nexus with the attached property.' 2 The basis for the doctrine was
7. Foreign attachment is a process issued against a nonresident debtor owning property
that has a forum situs. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 483.010 (West 1977); N.Y. Civ.
PREc. LAW & RULES §§ 6214-15 (McKinney 1974). The defendant's nonresidence is both a
traditional and uniformly applicable ground for state attachment. See M. GREEN, BASIC
CIVIL PROCEDURE 37 (1972).
This article concentrates upon foreign attachment because of its amenability to abuse
under traditional notions of fairness. A related problem, beyond the scope of this article, con-
cerns the questionable reasonableness of quasi in rem attachment by a nonresident plaintiff of
a nonresident defendant's property. See, e.g., Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812,
816-17 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969).
8. 1 R. SHINN, TREATISE ON AMERICAN LAW OF ATTACHMENT ANDGARNISHMENT I
(Indianapolis 1896) [hereinafter cited as R. SHINN]. For reference to attachment in the middle
ages, see Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1942).
9. See Locke, The Law and Practice of Foreign Attachment in the Lord Mayor's Court, in
C. DRAKE, TREATISE ON SUITS BY ATrACHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1858).
10. See R. SHINN, supra note 8, at 2-3.
Actually, there are two types of attachment. Prejudgment security attachment is a means
of obtaining security prior to enforcing a judgment. Normally, the attaching court has in per-
sonata jurisdiction over the defendant whose property is attached, and therefore, the device is
not used to acquire jurisdiction. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 33, 54 (1978). This type of attachment has recently been scrutinized under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (Court invalidated Georgia garnishment statute that did not provide
the defendant an opportunity to defend against the garnishment); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972) (Court invalidated Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes, which allowed
seizure of defendant's property without notice or opportunity to defend); Siadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Court held that Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnish-
ment statute, which froze defendant's wages before trial without opportunity to contest the
garnishment, violated the fourteenth amendment proscription against taking property without
due process).
The second type of attachment is jurisdictional attachment, and it is used by plaintiffs as a
last resort to compel a defendant to come into the forum and defend against the suit. Here, the
goal is not to enforce a judgment, but to obtain one. Silberman, supra note 10, at 59. This is
also the type of attachment with which the Shaffer Court was, and this article is, concerned.
As the Court recognized in Shaffer, the Delaware sequestration procedure was employed "to
compel the personal appearance of a nonresident defendant to answer and defend a suit
brought against him in a court of equity." Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, Letter Op. App. 75-76
(DeL Ch. 1975) as quoted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 193 (1978).
11. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
12. The state court judgment reviewed by the Pennoyer Court concerned Mitchell's con-
tract claim for attorney's fees ineffectually initiated without prejudgment attachment. The
Court noted that "[the property here in controversy sold under the judgment rendered was not
the "power" theory of jurisdiction, which was essentially territorial
in nature and was premised on two principles of public law-that
"every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory"' 3 and "that no state can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory."' 4 As Justice Holmes succinctly stated, "The
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power. . . ." " Thus, presence
of the defendant or his property in the territory, no matter how tran-
sient,' 6 became entrenched as the requirement for all assertions of
j urisdiction. 7
Years later, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 8 the
Supreme Court abolished presence of the defendant in the forum as
a prerequisite to in personam jurisdiction. Speaking for the Court,
Justice Stone said that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment inpersonam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' 9
Under this test a state could exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant whenever he had such contacts with the forum state as to
make it reasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit
there.20 This reasonableness test was later applied by International
Shoe's progeny to other bases for in personam jurisdiction2' such as
domicile,22 residence,23 consent,24 doing business,25 and ownership
attached, nor in any way brought under the jurisdiction of the court." Id at 720. See also
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 198 n.16 (1977).
13. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
14. Id
15. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (defendant subject to in personamjuris-
diction when all ties with the forum not broken although defendant in the process of establish-
ing a new domicile).
16. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443-44 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (defendant
served while passing over state in airplane). This type ofjurisdiction has not been without its
critics, however. See, e.g. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Non Conveniens 65 YALE L. J. 289, 293 (1956).
17. This standard applied whether jurisdiction was in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
19. Id at 316. The essential procedural due process requirement, announced five years
later, is best notice practicable. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950).
20. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
21. The subsequent revision of the Restatement of Conflicts reflects the contention that
mere physical presence, as a basis for jurisdiction, "is inconsistent with the basic principle of
reasonableness which underlies the field ofjudicial jurisdiction." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28, Comment a (1971).
22. See McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
23. Id
24. National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
25. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Actually, consid-
ering corporate or individual ownership of property as "doing business" for purposes of find-
of land within the forum giving rise to the claim sued upon.26
Despite International Shoe's impact on in personam jurisdiction,
however, few advances were made in the area of in rem and quasi in
rem jurisdiction.27
Finally, the Shaffer Court significantly altered, if not altogether
abolished,2" quasi in rem jurisdiction by requiring that the standard
of fairness and substantial justice used in International Shoe to deter-
mine the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction be applied to
all assertions of jurisdiction.29 Thus, mere physical presence of prop-
erty in the forum state will no longer suffice to support an assertion
of quasi in rem jurisdiction if the property is unrelated to the claim.
Nevertheless, as Justice Marshall pointed out, applying the reasona-
bleness test to in rem and quasi in rem actions in which claims to the
property are the basis of jurisdiction will not effect any major
changes.3 0 For example, a quiet title or ejectment proceeding
survives Shaffer's invasion of the in rem and quasi in rem wings of
the power theory and therefore will not engender much critical anal-
ysis.3' Rather, future judicial debate will necessarily focus on juris-
dictional disputes in which unrelated real property is arguably
subject to attachment.
ing jurisdiction under the Izternational Shoe test defies logic when the property is related to
plaintiffs claim only because the claim arises in or is brought in the situs forum. Apparently,
the unavailability of an alternate forum is considered a relevant factor in determining whether
jurisdiction satisfies minimum contacts. See, e.g., Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d
426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
26. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 38(l) (1971). Owner-
ship, use, or possession of land does not create a sufficient relationship between the individual
and the state for jurisdiction over the individual for claims unrelated to the land. Id at com-
ment a. Nevertheless, these interests may constitute a traditional basis for quasi in rem juris-
diction when the land is clearly tied to conduct resulting in a lawsuit. For example, plaintiff
may assert an interest in the land, as in quiet title or ejectment cases, seeking establishment of
his interest only as against designated parties or privies. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 32,
Comment a & § 3, Comment b (1942).
27. But see cases cited in note 10 supra.
28. According to Justice Brennan, quasi in rem jurisdiction was "no longer constitution-
ally viable" under the Court's principal holding. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 220 (1977)
(Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Silberman, supra note 10, at
71. "If the minimum contacts test for quasi in rem actions is equivalent to the one used for in
personam jurisdiction, then the Shaffer Court probably eliminated quasi in rem jurisdiction as
we have known it".
29. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
30. Id at 208-09. The Court specified that "when claims to the property itself are the
source of the underlying controversy... it would be unusual for the State where the property
is located not to have jurisdiction." Id at 207.
31. The Court noted that "[i]n such cases, the defendant's claim to property located in
the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his
interest" id at 207-8 (footnote omitted), and at least one federal district court recognizes that
"even after Shaffer, the presence of defendants' property can provide a basis for jurisdiction."
Engineering Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quasi in rem
jurisdiction sustained where cargo damage and misdelivery arose out of attached vessel's con-
tacts with claim).
B. The Shaffer Decision
Shaffer concerned the constitutionality of Delaware's sequestra-
tion statute.32 Plaintiff Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware who
owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, filed a
shareholder's derivative suit in Delaware against the officers and di-
rectors of the Greyhound Corporation, which had both its principal
place of business and its headquarters in Arizona.33 None of the
defendants were residents of Delaware, but several of them owned
common stock in the Greyhound Corporation, which was incorpo-
rated in Delaware. Since a Delaware statute34 reserved the situs of
Delaware corporate stock in Delaware, rather than in the state where
the certificates were located,35 plaintiff Heitner was able to sequester
the defendant's stock and compel the defendants to appear and de-
fend the suit, even though the stock was completely unrelated to the
lawsuit. The defendants appeared specially to dismiss the complaint
and vacate the sequestration on the ground that the seizure violated
the due process clause,36 but the chancery court denied their motion.
On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
stock's statutory situs provided a sufficient basis for asserting quasi
in rem jurisdiction over the stock37 and that because the presence of
the stock, not a prior contact by the defendants with the forum, was
the basis of the jurisdiction, the minimum contacts test did not ap-
ply.38 The United States Supreme Court clearly disagreed, however.
Justice Marshall's majority opinion focused on the Pennoyer
power theory of jurisdiction, which had established quasi in rem ju-
risdiction over property unrelated to the claim, up to International
Shoe. This review laid the groundwork for his case that the in per-
sonam reasonableness test should apply to all assertions of jurisdic-
tion. He argued that "if a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant would violate the Constitution, it would seem
that an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be equally im-
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366(a) (Michie 1974). The statute permits a Delaware
court to assume jurisdiction over an action by sequestering a defendant's property located in
Delaware.
33. 433 U.S. at 189 & n.l.
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (Michie 1974).
35. Delaware is the only state that does not adopt U.C.C. § 8-317, which places the situs
of stock ownership where the stock certificates are located.
36. First, they argued, their ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation did not
provide a sufficient nexus with the forum state to satisfy the minimum contacts test of
International Shoe. Second, they contended, even if the court had jurisdiction, the
sequestration was unconstitutional because it was accomplished without the prior no-
tice and hearing required by the due process clause.
Silberman, Supra note 10, at 38.
37. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 1976), rev'dsub nonL Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
38. Id at 229.
permissible."3 9 Thus, he reasoned, to justify an exercise of in rem
jurisdiction, the basis of the jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify
exercising "jurisdiction over the interests of a person in a thing, '
that is, it must meet the minimum contacts standard.4'
As noted earlier, Justice Marshall recognized that when the de-
fendant's property is present in the state, other factors will normally
supply the nexus required by International Shoe, especially when the
property is the source of the underlying controversy.42 Therefore,
claims in these situations will not be affected by applying the mini-
mum contacts test.43 Nevertheless, he also noted that
although the presence of the defendant's property in a State might
suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State,
and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not
support the State's jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist,
cases over which the State is now thought- to have jurisdiction
could not be brought in that forum.44
Thus, Pennoyer's power standard and the leading case support-
ing quasi in rem jurisdiction over property unrelated to the claim
45
were overruled to the extent that they were inconsistent with the
minimum contacts standard.' The majority would not entertain the
plaintiff's arguments that the need to secure obligations, 47 the uncer-
tainty of the minimum contacts standard,48 the unavailability of an-
other forum,4 9 and tradition5' should dictate against replacing
Pennoyer's power test with International Shoe's reasonableness test
in this category of litigation.
Prior to Shaffer most commentators urged the rejection of "Pen-
noyer's premise that a proceeding 'against' property is not a proceed-
ing against the owners of that property."' I Therefore, it is not
39. 433 U.S. at 209.
40. Id at 207.
41. "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evalu-
ated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." Id at 212.
Although the case has been reported to have overruled Pennoyer, Young, Supreme Court
Report, 63 A.B.A.J. 1612 (1977), Pennoyer was overruled only to the extent that its power basis
for judicial jurisdiction is inconsistent with International Shoe's reasonableness basis for such
jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977).
42. 433 U.S. at 207-08. These other factors, which include presence of records and wit-
nesses in the state and "the state's interests in assuring marketability of property within its
borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about possession of
that property," do not necessarily supply a nexus, but rather make jurisdiction more reason-
able.
43. See text accompanying notes 30-3f supra.
44. Id at 209 (emphasis added). "These are the cases where the property which now
serves as the basis for state court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of
action." Id at 208-09. See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 32, Comment a (1942).
45. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
46. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
47. Id at 210.
48. Id at 211.
49. Id at n.37.
50. Id at 211-12.
51. Id at 205.
surprising that the Shaffer Court was dissatisfied with Delaware's
purported quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant's
corporate stock; in Shaffer the stock had a statutory situs in Dela-
ware and was completely unrelated to the lawsuit.52 The majority
expressly declined to consider, however, the issue of quasi in rem
jurisdiction over unrelated property when plaintiff has no other fo-
rum available where he can secure a remedy. Apparently, the ma-
jority believed that the reasonableness test could be adequately
applied in most cases without causing uncertainty.
C. Shaffer's Concurring Opinions: Quo Vadis?
Justice Powell's concurring opinion expressed concern that a
broad interpretation of the majority opinion would unduly inject un-
certainty into jurisdictional disputes involving real property. As to
this limited species of attachable property, he suggested that preser-
vation of the traditional scheme would not interfere significantly
with International Shoe's reasonableness standard even though pres-
ence would be the essential contact with the litigation.3 Unfortu-
nately, he did not specify whether the Pennoyer power principle
survived to the extent that property was permanently located within
the state or whether its indisputable presence actually satisfied the
test of International Shoe. 54
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion evidenced concern with ap-
52. Nevertheless, the traditionally conservative Court decided far more than necessary to
dispose of a constitutional case of indiscernible proportions and, apparently, was looking for a
case to obliterate the distinction. Shaffer's facts deal with a relatively narrow aspect of all
possible in rem and quasi in rem bases for judicial jurisdiction governed by Pennoyer's mere
presence test after International Shoe and prior to Shaffer, that is, equitable sequestration of
directors' and officers' stock as the jurisdictional contact in a shareholder's derivative action.
Delaware asserted jurisdiction solely on the basis of the statutory presence of the defendants'
stock in the state; nothing in the record was directed to the question of minimum contacts.
Hence, although the Court was willing to glean sufficient inferences to characterize the matter
as appropriate for establishing the uniform minimum contacts standard, it is arguable that the
Shaffer Court had a deficient record for purposes of determining the constitutional question.
Justice Brennan stated, "[Tihe Court today is unable to draw upon a proper factual record in
reaching its conclusion." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 221 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting). Likewise, Justice Stevens expressed his "fear that [the majority opinion] pur-
ports to decide a great deal more than is necessary to dispose of this case. ... Id at 219
(Stevens, J., concurring).
The Court could have held quasi in rem jurisdiction subject to the minimum contacts
standard and remanded the case for consideration of whether the standard was met, or it could
have applied the standard itself, "but confined its discussion to the sufficiency of the contacts
provided by the presence of the property in the state, and could have concluded on that basis
alone that because the cause of action was unrelated to the property the required contacts were
not present." Note, Measuring the Long Arm After Shaffer Y. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 126,
131 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
53. Id at 217.
54. Silberman, supra note 10, at 68. Professor Silberman points out that "if Justice Pow-
eli's problem with the Delaware statute is only with the attachment of the intangible corporate
stock, his quarrel is with Harris Y. Balk rather than Pennoyer itself." Id (footnotes omitted).
plication of-the majority opinion in other factual contexts." He ap-
parently shared Justice Powell's apprehension regarding a broad
interpretation of Shaffer to invalidate quasi in rem jurisdiction over
real property unrelated to the claim.56 His terse analysis focused
upon the defendant's assumption of the risk that a state may exercise
jurisdiction over his property since "[c]ontact with the state, though
minimal, gives rise to predictable risks. ' 57 Nevertheless, he empha-
sized that the type of property at issue could determine the expecta-
tions of the owners. For example, a person buying real property in a
state could reasonably be expected to assume the risk that the state
would exercise jurisdiction over him. One who merely purchases se-
curities on the domestic market, however, could not be expected to
assume the risk that a state court will assert jurisdiction over him on
an unrelated claim simply because the stock was in a corporation
incorporated in the state.5 8 Thus, like Justice Powell, Justice Stevens
would not invalidate a state court's assertion of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion when real property was involved.59
Finally, Justice Brennan agreed that the minimum contacts
analysis was a better measure for state court assertions of jurisdiction
than the Pennoyer standard, but dissented from the majority's appli-
cation of the reasonableness test in this case.' He believed that the
majority's evaluation of the minimum contacts question should not
have been reached because both the Delaware Supreme Court and
the parties made it plain that the Delaware sequestration statute op-
erated strictly as an embodiment of quasi in rem jurisdiction.6'
Justice Brennan also felt that the Court should not have fore-
closed Delaware from asserting jurisdiction "to adjudicate a share-
holder's derivative action centering on the conduct and policies of
directors and officers of a corporation chartered by that State"
62 if
the State did so on the basis of minimum contacts. In his view, a
55. 433 U.S. at 219.
56. Justice Stevens expressly agreed with Justice Powell's commentary about the unnec-
essary reach of the majority opinion. He stated, "I agree with Mr. Justice Powell that [the
majority opinion] should not be read to invalidate in rem jurisdiction where real estate is
involved." Id Justice Stevens most likely intended this statement to exhibit his belief that
quasi in rem jurisdiction over unrelated real property retains post-Shaffer vitality.
57. Id at 218.
58. Id at 218-19. Professor Silberman points out, however, that Justice Stevens failed to
articulate how the expectations of the parties could be identified. Silberman, supra note 10, at
69.
59. "I agree with Justice Powell that [the majority opinion] should not be read to invali-
date in rem jurisdiction where real estate is involved." 433 U.S. at 219. Again, Professor Sil-
berman points out that "like Justice Powell, Justice Stevens did not clarify whether Pennoyer
survived to that extent or whether the existence of such facts would satisfy the test of Interna-
tional Shoe. Silberman, spra note 10, at 69 n. 196.
60. 433 U.S. at 219-20 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id at 219. In his view, "a purer example of an advisory opinion is not to be found."
Id at 220.
62. Id at 222.
state's valid substantive interests were important considerations in
determining whether jurisdiction over a claim was constitutional.
63
In this respect, he placed much less emphasis than did the majority
on the distinction between choice of law and jurisdictional inquiries.
Adopting former Justice Black's view that both inquiries "are often
closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon similar con-
siderations,"'  he contended that "[at] the minimum, the decision
that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws and rules should
prove to be highly relevant to the fairness of permitting that same
State to accept jurisdiction for adjudicating the controversy.
65
Under Justice Brennan's minimum contacts analysis the defendants
voluntarily invoked the benefits and protections of Delaware's laws
and, therefore, could be subject to the state's jurisdiction without vi-
olating the Constitution.
D. Constitutional Bar to Special Statusfor Real Property
The concurring opinions raised interesting questions about the
full impact of the majority decision. Obviously, mere presence of
property will not be directly asserted in support of jurisdiction.
Mere presence may, however, make it indirectly reasonable to attach
the property and thereby retain the Pennoyer power theory in some
categories of quasi in rem actions. Hence, the arguments that unre-
lated real property may be both an essential contact and a jurisdic-
tionally sufficient contact under current notions of fair play and
substantial justice must be examined for conflict with due process.
Justices Powell's and Stevens' concurring opinions suggested
that the relation to claim requirement be relaxed when for example,
permanent situs66 or fair notice67 considerations exist. Embryonic
post-Shaffer commentary on this question appears to be split. Writ-
ers strictly interpreting the case anticipate denial of quasi in rem ju-
63. Id at 223. These interests include providing restitution for its victimized local corpo-
rations, regulating an area in which the state has a manifest interest, and providing a forum to
oversee the affairs of state-created institutions. Id at 224-26.
64. Id at 224-25, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
65. 433 U.S. at 225. "Furthermore, I believe that practical considerations argue in favor
of seeking to bridge the distance between choice-of-law and jurisdictional inquiries." Id
66. In the case of real property, in particular, preservation of the common law con-
cept of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably would avoid the uncertainty of the general
International Shoe standard without significant cost to "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice". 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
The requirement of fair notice also, I believe, includes fair warning that a particular
activity may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. If I visit
another state, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume
some risk that the state will exercise its power over my property or my person while
there. My contact with the state, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks.
Id at 218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
risdiction when the seized asset is unrelated to the claim.6" Those
interpreting Shaffer more narrowly would condone such jurisdiction
for various reasons, including choice of law interest analysis,69 anal-
ogy to doing business in the forum,70 a lower level reasonableness
test for quasi in rem jurisdiction,7 or the defendant's inability to
collaterally attack when he has not entered a limited appearance to
raise his objection to the jurisdiction.72
Constitutional bars may exist, however, against requiring actual
minimum contacts for moveables and intangibles while permitting
fictional minimum contacts for jurisdiction over unrelated real prop-
erty." The United States Supreme Court is both final arbiter of the
68. In support of a logically consistent jurisdictional approach, one commentator argues
as follows:
Hence, as Justices Powell and Stevens suggest, Shaffer might be read to hold asser-
tions of jurisdiction quasi in rem unconstitutional only if the defendant is not allowed
to enter a limited appearance or if the assets seized are not a tangible or fixed nature
and knowingly exposed by the defendant to the jurisdiction of a state. Neither of
these narrow interpretations of Shaffer, though, is consistent with the Court's reason-
ing or with jurisdictional theory as shaped by International Shoe.
Comment, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 70, 158 (1977) (footnote omit-
ted). See also Note, Shaffer x Heitner. A New Attitude Toward State Court Jurisdiction, 13
TULSA L. REv. 82, 92-93 (1977).
69. See Comment, Quasi in Rem on the heels of Shaffer v. Heitner: If the International
Shoe Fits .. , 46 FoRDrAm L. REV. 459, 472 (1977).
One post-Shaffer commentator urges that "[a]lthough the state's interest cannot create
contacts between the state and the defendant, the interest might bear on the fairness of an
assertion of jurisdiction if that interest is viewed as sufficiently important." Note, The Ex-
panded Scope of the Sufficient Minimum Contacts Standard" Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L.
REV. 504, 521 (1977).
70. See Comment, supra note 69, at 472.
71. Professor Silberman offers three possible ways in which a quasi in rem attachment of
property unrelated to the claim can remain a valid source of state adjudicatory power.
The first depends on whether a double standard emerges with which to test mini-
mum contacts in quasi in rem type-II [property unrelated the claim] actions. If the
minimum contacts test for quasi in rem actions is equivalent to the one used for in
personam jurisdiction, then the Shaffer Court probably eliminated quasi in rem juris-
diction as we have known it. It is quite possible, however, that certain minimum
contacts that are insufficient when standing alone in an in personam action might
pass the constitutional threshold in a quasi in rem action when coupled with the
attachment of the defendant's property in the state. For example, in this country the
citizenship or residence of the plaintiff, without more, has never been adequate to
confer jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant not present in the state. Yet perhaps
the plaintiff's residence together with some other contact like the physical presence of
the defendant's property in the state or a connection between the claim and the prop-
erty might be enough to trigger the lower (or quasi in rem) level of a newly fashioned
International Shoe inquiry. Certainly nothing explicit in Shaffer precludes these pos-
sibilities.
Silberman, supra note at 71-72 (footnotes omitted).
Silberman cites Omni Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Activaclades Aereas Arazonesas, No. 77-669
(D. Ariz. Nov. 15, 1977) as a case that supports the applicability of a double standard. Silber-
man, supra at 73.
For the other two possible ways in which Professor Silberman believes a quasi in rem
attachment of unrelated real property can be a valid exercise of state power, see id at 74-77.
72. See Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory, 26
KANSAS L. REv. 61, 79-80 (1977).
73. For example, equal protection bars improper classifications of individuals. See
generaly Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1949), which deals with standards of review issues that now are currently emerging. Individu-
als may not be distinguished by judicial fiat involving quasi in rem jurisdiction in a way that
contemporary meaning of due process and the unifying force con-
cerning matters of compulsory civil process arising in state courts.
74
In International Shoe the Court determined that due process "[d]oes
not contemplate that a state may make a binding judgment . . .
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties or relations."75 Later, the Court refined this
framework by holding that "it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invok-
ing the benefits and protections of its laws."76 Under this language,
the minimum contacts test appears to support the theory that posses-
sion or use of property subjects the owner to litigating his interest in
the state where the property is located since the state affords fire,
police and other related protections and benefits. The Shaffer deci-
sion, however, clearly recognizes that although the presence of the
property might suggest the existence of other ties, presence alone will
not support situs jurisdiction for unrelated litigation.77
Thus, the shift from power to reasonableness as the due process
measure of jurisdiction over property means that jurisdictional at-
tachment of real property survives Shaffer only if the property has a
nexus with the claim; but if actual contacts are lacking, due process
cannot be met since it is inherently unreasonable to require a prop-
erty owner to yield substantive due process rights by virtue of owner-
ship. Although several arguments can be made for retaining quasi in
rem jurisdiction over real property unrelated to the claim, none of
those arguments meet International Shoe's due process requirements.
III. Arguments for Retaining Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Over
Real Property Unrelated to the Claim
A. Unavailability ofAnother Forum
The Shaffer Court specifically reserved the issue whether the
unavailability of other forums for the plaintiff would justify attach-
ment of the defendant's property in a quasi in rem action." If a fo-
results in exposure to attachment of unrelated real property but nonexposure of unrelated
moveables or intangibles.
74. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
75. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
76. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
77. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977). Apparently, the Court wanted to
limit the breadth of this rationale for its decision. "This case does not raise, and we therefore
do not consider, the question whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at
211 n.37.
78. Id
rum has no long-arm statute, 79 its long-arm statute is inapplicable,80
or the defendant cannot be located,81 a necessity argument would
certainly be appropriate. Absent a long-arm statute, it may be eco-
nomically or strategically impossible for a certain class of plaintiffs
to pursue a claim. Moreover, the size of the claim may not justify
litigating it in a distant forum. In addition, witnesses and evidence
may be more conveniently located in a forum in which the defendant
owns attachable property rather than in defendant's forum.8 2 Given
these practicalities, concern for the plaintiff's inconvenience is rea-
sonable. Indeed, the Shaffer Court may not have intended to ex-
pand defendant property owners' due process rights at the cost of
depriving plaintiffs of their traditional quasi in rem remedies when
in personam jurisdiction is unobtainable.83
Nevertheless, that all plaintiffs need forums and some do not
have them is insufficient reason to conclude that the unavailability of
a forum is a basis of jurisdiction. The clearly established trend has
been to sanction expansion of jurisdiction over nonresidents only in
conjunction with the correlative expansion of their due process
rights. Shaffer obliterated Justice Holmes' oft-quoted statement that
jurisdiction is founded upon physical power of the forum over per-
sons and things within it' by replacing power with reasonableness
as the yardstick for jurisdiction in the quasi in rem branch of juris-
diction. Due process requires that attached property be related to
plaintiff's claim,85 and this demand is clearly all encompassing. Al-
though allowing jurisdiction over a defendant's unrelated real prop-
erty to bring the defendant before the court may be reasonable, fair,
and just from the plaintiff's point of view, it ignores the defendant's
due process interests and violates the Constitution just as much as
would a direct assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant.
86
There is an additional reason why the problem with plaintiff's
alleged procedural impotence should not be shifted to the nonresi-
dent defendant who happens to own unrelated local property. Ab-
79. See generaly Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark.521, 249S.W.2d 994 (1952) (ac-
tion involving real property characterized as transitory absent forum long-arm statute).
80. See generaly American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp.,
439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971) (specifically enumerated state long-arm provisions precluded fed-
eral diversity court from finding jurisdiction over corporate employer although jurisdiction
existed over its employees).
81. See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
(quasi in rem jurisdiction over local trust property via forum publication, absent identity and
location of defendants).
82. This consideration, however, assumes some contacts between the defendant, the liti-
gation and the forum.
83. This issue was implicitly reserved by the Shaffer Court. See note 77 supra,
84. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
85. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977). See also text accompanying notes 40-46
supra
86. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977).
sence of a long-arm statute or an applicable extraterritorial service
scheme may evidence the determination of the forum state that the
defendant should not be subject to such process.8 7 This view would
be explainable, not as a comparative favoring of defendants by the
forum state, but as an apparent recognition that contemporary social
and economic mobility renders distant filing of claims more feasible.
When an applicable long-arm statute exists, but defendant's
whereabouts are unknown, one could argue that attachment of the
defendant's unrelated real property is a needed quasi in rem remedy
against the absentee defendant. Superficially, this argument is rea-
sonable since a defendant should not be able to escape his obliga-
tions."8 Equitable considerations would especially dictate that
jurisdiction attach when a potential defendant engages in fraudulent
conduct to avoid creditors.8 9 A rule of law favoring jurisdiction by
necessity, however, cannot survive the due process impediment im-
posed by Shaffer. ' Unavailability of another forum is not equal to
the existence of jurisdictional ties inherent in fair play and substan-
tial justice.9 There must be a more substantial nexus between the
87. The converse, however, is not true. An explicit state long-arm statute expressing in-
terest in asserting jurisdiction, although evidencing the state's determination to subject the
defendant to process, should not shift the plaintiff's procedural impotence to the defendant.
But cf. Note, Measuring the Long Arm After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 136
(1978) ("The novelty of the Shaffer Court's approach was the suggestion that although the
defendants' contacts with Delaware were constitutionally insufficient, the existence of a statute
would remedy the due process deficiency.")
88. It was generally recognized prior to Shaffer that
[i]t is customary for states to provide by statute that tangible things within their terri-
tory may be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the owner's obligations.
Such jurisdiction is commonly exercised through a proceeding begun by attachment
or by a bill in equity [sequestration].
A state has judicial jurisdiction to entertain a suit if it has jurisdiction either over
the defendant's person or over a thing in which he has an interest. When personal
jurisdiction over the defendant is lacking, the judgment must be limited to the de-
fendant's interests in the thing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 66, Comments a & c (1971).
89. For a discussion of problems with this remedy for fraud, see Comment, Developments
in the Law of State-Court Jurdietion, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 955 (1960).
90. The Shaffer majority opinion specifically found that "[Tihe presence of property
alone would not support the State's jurisdiction." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977).
The Court did not limit its holding to moveables or intangibles, but was addressing itself to all
property forms including real property.
91. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall explicitly excepted the question from the Court's hold-
ing, see note 77 supra, and at least one commentator suggests that when no alternative forum is
available, quasi in rem action in which the property is unrelated to the claim could remain a
proper source of state court jurisdiction.
The unavailability of an alternate forum has always been considered a relevant,
albeit not dispositive, factor in determining whether jurisdiction based on doing busi-
ness in the forum state satisfied the International Shoe test. See Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airlines, 15
N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439, 440-41, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628-29 (1965).
Silberman, supra note 10, at 76, n.238.
defendant's conduct and his absentee ownership of real property
than merely its amenability to being attached.
The uniform touchstone of jurisdiction is reasonableness. Per-
mitting attachment on fortuitous grounds is inconsistent with the re-
quirement that the subject property be genuinely connected with the
dispute. Absent fraud, unavailability of another forum does not gen-
erate from defendant's conduct, but rather from inadequate forum
rules. Thus, endowing real property, as opposed to moveable and
intangible property, with a special jurisdictional status because of its
undisputed situs would generate the very disparity that Shaffer in-
tended to repeal.
B. Assumption of Risk Through Purposeful Contact Invoking
Forum Benefits
An assumption of risk argument for retaining quasi in rem juris-
diction over real property unrelated to the claim naturally begins
with Hanson v. Denkla.92 The Hanson Court emphasized the need
for a reasonable nexus between defendant and the forum and clearly
indicated that a defendant's purposeful availment of forum benefits
and protection is sufficient to support jurisdiction.93 Hence, it may be
asserted that forum ownership of real property gives rise to the pre-
dictable risk that the quid pro quo for forum protection is amenabil-
ity to attachment."
The strength of the bond between unrelated real property and
the forum would be determined by a mecnahical application of Han-
son's purposeful availment test. In Hanson the Court disavowed ju-
risdiction when plaintiffs conduct required defendant to deal with
the forum resident as to trust property that was the subject of the
litigation. Mere ownership of forum property, however, constitutes a
far more tenuous basis for demonstrating the requisite jurisdictional
ties95 than the prolonged, substantial but insufficient forum conduct
92. 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (Florida is without in personam jurisdiction over Delaware
trustee administering Pennsylvania trust created by Florida testatrix, previously domiciled in
Pennsylvania, since the trustee did not purposefuily avail itself of benefits and protection of
Florida law).
93. Id at 253.
94. See test accompanying note 57, supra.
In Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court, relying on
Justice Stevens expectation notion, upheld an assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction based on
the attachment of a foreign defendant's New York bank account and rejected the defendant's
contention that mere presence of the account was an insufficient contact.
95. As confirmed by a post-Shaffer federal opinion, "When the claim sued upon is unre-
lated to the defendant's forum activities, he may have 'no reason to expect to be haled before
[the forum state's] court[s]."' Toro Co. v. Ballas Liquidating Co., 572 F.2d 1267, 1271 (8th Cir.
1978) (rejecting long-arm jurisdiction for lack of contacts), quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, - (1977), but cfFeder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court up-
held assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction based on attachment of Turkish defendant's New
York bank account in wrongful death action growing out of airplane crash in Turkey).
of the defendant in Hanson. 9 6 Although the taxpaying property own-
er expects to earn the usual incidents of municipal protection flowing
from the state, these paid-for expectations should not result in waiv-
ing the reasonableness limitation imposed upon quasi in rem attach-
ment by the Due Process Clause.97 Otherwise, mere presence of
property, which was the basis for judicial jurisdiction under Pen-
noyer, would survive notwithstanding Shaffer's express letter98 and
spirit.99 Such an indirect assertion of personal jurisdiction is no
longer permissible on the basis of ownership of real property in the
forum.
C Application of a Choice of Law Interest Approach to
Jurisdiction
The Court's summary reference to presence of unrelated prop-
erty suggesting the existence of other ties among the defendant, state
and litigation"°° has engendered the position that a functional choice
of law approach may appropriately authorize jurisdictional attach-
ment.'I' If conflict of laws principles are utilized to fill this judicial
gap, the interests of the plaintiff and forum could quantitatively out-
weigh the interests of the defendant.
Ownership of property permanently located in the forum would
expose the owner's interests to attachment since permanent situs nec-
essarily involves property in forum social, economic and legal mat-
96. The nonresident trustee engaged in multiple transactions with the forum trustor for
eight years prior to generation of the dispute.
97. See note 90 supra.
98. The Court expressly disavowed quasi in rem jurisdiction completely unrelated to
plaintiff's claim since presence of property alone cannot comply with fair play and substantial
justice. Id at 208-09.
99. The Court noted that " this type of case also presents the clearest illustration of the
argument in favor of assessing assertions of jurisdiction by a single standard." Id at 209.
As noted earlier, the Court left undecided whether mere presence of property will suffice
when no other forum is available. Besides the question of when a court will consider a plain-
tiff to have no other available forum, it is unclear whether the exercise of jurisdiction in this
situation would be an exception to Shaffer and, therefore, a limited retention of the power
theory of jurisdiction, or whether it is an application of the minimum contacts test. Professor
Silberman points out that resolution of this question can have practical consequences. For
example, if the power theory is rejected completely as contrary to due process, and all asser-
tions of jurisdiction must be justified on a fairness rationale, then
the traditional basis of physical "tag" for serving a defendant within a state-a basis
grounded on notions of territorial sovereignty and one that permits the exercise of
jurisdiction no matter how transient the defendant's presence in the state or how
unrelated the cause of action-would be constitutionally suspect. If, on the other
hand, [an assertion of jurisdiction over property unrelated to the suit when no other
forum is available] is explained as an exception to Shaffer'r holding and justified by
the traditional power over tangible property, the transient presence rule might sur-
vive in the in personam area.
Silberman, supra note 10 at 75-76 (footnotes omitted).
100. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977).
101. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 69, at 472; Silberman, supra note 10 at 79-90.
ters. t0 2 Nevertheless, the necessary tie between the real property
owner and the forum would actually accrue by virtue of plaintifi's
need for a forum. 03 This result, though ostensibly based upon con-
siderations of fairness, really considers only the plaintiff's interests
and impermissibly emasculates the defendant's due process interest.
A defendant should now justifiably expect that mere ownership of
forum property, without more, no longer supports quasi in rem juris-
diction; although ownership might suggest other contacts, neither the
governmental interest approach' °4 nor the most significant contacts
approach105 to conflict of laws should be used to jurisdictionally con-
firm this "suggestion."
When the property is related to the plaintiffs claim, contacts
that are considered adequate for choice of law would also support
jurisdiction,"t °6 but would be insufficient to support jurisdiction in the
case of unrelated real property.0 7 The Supreme Court has twice re-
jected the argument that proper application of a particular state's
102. Smit, The Enduring Utility of ln Ren Rules.'A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer Y. Neff, 43
BROOKLYN L. Rav. 600, 617 (1977).
103. See generally Comment, supra note 69, at 477.
104. As defined by one of the leading cases,
[T]he "comparative impairment" approach to the resolution of such conflict seeks to
determine which state's interest would be more impaired if its policy were
subordinated to the policy of the other state. This analysis proceeds on the principle
that true conflicts should be resolved by applying the law of the state whose interest
would be the more impaired if its law were not applied.
Bernard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 320, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 221 (1976). See generally
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963); Horowitz, The Law
of Choice in Calfornia - A Restatement, 21 UCLA L. REv. 719, 748 (1974). Assessing the
various interests of the states whose laws are in conflict has become the dominant mode of
analyzing choice of law problems. See D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PRocESs 63-64
(1965); vonMehren, Recent Trendr in Choice ofLaw Methodology, 60 CORNELL LAW REVIEW
927, 928-41 (1975).
105. As defined by one of the leading cases, "Justice, fairness and 'the best practical result'
may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with
the specific issue raised in the litigation." Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963) (citations omitted). For a symposium article regarding the most
significant contacts approach to choice of law, see Commhents on Babcock Y. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict 0/Laws, 63 COL. L. REv. 1212 (1963).
106. As stated by the Shaffer Court,
The standard for determining whether an exercise ofjurisdiction over the interests of
persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum contacts standard
elucidated in International Shoe.
This argument, of course, does not ignore the fact that the presence of property
in a State may bear on the existence ofjurisdiction by providing contacts among the
forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For example, when claims to property
itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant ....
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
107. But cf. Comment, supra note 69, at 472 (when the doing business test and interest
balancing approach are combined, the defendant's otherwise unrelated property provides req-
uisite jurisdictional ties); Comment, The Reasonableness Standard in State-Court Iur'sdictio"
Shaffer v Heitner and the Uniform Minimum Contacts Theory, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51,
77 n.131 (1978) (seizure necessary to secure important governmental interest); Note, The Ex-
panded Scope of the Sufficient Minimum Contacts Standard Shaffer v Heitner, 63 IOWA L.
Ray. 504, 520-21 (1977) (state's interest may bear upon fairness of assertion of jurisdiction).
law will necessarily result in jurisdiction over persons and things,108
and Shaffer apparently reasserted the implications of Hanson that
more contacts are needed for jurisdiction than for choice of law.' °9
In this writer's opinion, applicability of the choice of law inter-
est analysis is, using its own balancing process, more unreasonable
than not. Unrelated real property, however permanently situated in
the forum, does not demonstrate the type of forum activity that
should result in the jurisdictional ties required by Shaffer. 110 Al-
though its owner has social and economic ties with the forum, utili-
zation of these contacts for both choice of law and jurisdictional
purposes would realistically base jurisdiction upon mere presence of
land. This result would certainly be incongruous in the so-called
reasonableness era spawned by Shaffer. The defendant does not, by
reason of owning the property, impliedly consent to its exposure to
quasi in rem attachment on claims unrelated to the land attached. If
ownership of property were deemed to be within Hanson's pur-
poseful availment test, jurisdiction would be grounded in fortuitous-
ness rather than fairness.
The continued vitality of quasi in rem jurisdiction over unre-
lated real property, but not moveables or intangibles, would be a
"perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified. . .[and]
that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heri-
108. In Shaffer the Court affirmed that it had
rejected the argument that if a State's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its
courts necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute.
[The State] does not acquire . . . jurisdiction by being the center of gravity of
the controversy, or the most convenient location for the litigation. The issue is per-
sonal jurisdiction, not choice of law.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977), quoting Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 254
(1958). See also Kulko v. Superior Court, 46 U.S.L.W. 4421, 4425 (U.S. May 15, 1978) (Cali-
fornia law may apply in New York action for child support, but California courts lack jurisdic-
tion to hear case).
109. Professor Silberman likewise recognizes this point. Silberman Supra note 10, at 82.
Justice Brennan criticized the majority for rejecting the state's interest in providing a forum as
bearing upon due process fairness. He reasoned as follows:
I believe that practical considerations argue in favor of seeking to bridge the distance
between the choice-of-law and jurisdictional inquiries. . . . [When a suitor seeks to
lodge a suit in a State with a substantial interest in seeing its own law applied to the
transaction in question, we could wisely act to minimize conflicts, confusion, and
uncertainty by adopting a liberal view of jurisdiction, unless considerations of fair-
ness or efficiency strongly point in the opposite direction.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225-26 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
110. See, e.g., note 106 supra Contra, Silberman, supra note 10, at 82. Professor Silber-
man believes that "The impact of a conflict of laws decision more seriously affects the rights of
the parties than a decision on jurisdiction, which merely directs the parties to an appropriate
forum in which to litigate their case." Id at 82-83. Thus, except possibly for the situation in
which the state applies its own laws solely to compensate resident plaintiffs, she asserts that "if
a court has thepo wer to apply its own law, it should have the power to exercise jurisdiction over
the action." Id at 88. Professor Silberman bases her position on what she perceives to be a
correlation between choice of law and the forum in which to apply the law. Id at 89.
tage."' I IAcquiescence in this distinction would cause too great a
cost to judicial notions of fair play and would, therefore, derogate
from the quest for uniformity of result. Short of ressurrecting the
physical power test of jurisdiction, it is too difficult to rationalize a
basis for placing real property in this special jurisdictional category.
D. Avoiding the Uncertainty of the Minimum Contacts Inquiry as
to Forum Land
By substituting a reasonableness test for the previous mere pres-
ence test of jurisdiction, Shaffer introduces an element of uncertainty
since presence of property does not automatically confer jurisdiction,
as was previously possible under Pennoyer. Indeed, Justices Pow-
eli's" 2 and Stevens"' 3 concurring opinions could fairly be read to
imply that the power approach might be preserved for real property,
absent a viable method of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over
the owner. 1 4 Arguably, this would serve to avoid uncertainty with-
out substantial cost to Shaffer's relation to claim requirement." 15
Merely determining whether the land is present, rather than utiliza-
tion of the minimum contacts test, avoids a more sophisticated judi-
cial inquiry that could fluctuate with the composition of the Court
and vacillating notions of fair play and substantial justice." I 6
The latent constitutional flaw in this position, however, can be
drawn from judicial concern with adverse implications of the power
theory of jurisdiction. Although land ownership may logically sug-
gest additional ties,' '7 the uncertainties of applying the new contacts
test in no way confirm this suggestion. Nevertheless, this uncertainty
should not avoid the recognized need for finding contacts surmount-
ing the due process barrier. Presence alone does no more than boot-
strap attachment beyond the minimum contact sought by the Shaffer
Court.
If the power principle of jurisdiction is clandestinely retained
for quasi in rem jurisdiction to secure, indirectly, personal jurisdic-
tion over an absentee defendant, the desire for an integrated theory
of judicial jurisdiction with a single standard for ensuring fair play
would be thwarted. Moreover, the ambiguity injected into Shaffer's
relation to claim mandate, which would arguably permit real prop-
111. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
112. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977) (Powell, J. concurring).
113. Id at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
114. But see text accompanying note 54 supra, and note 59 supra.
115. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
116. See note 3 supra.
117. As stated by the Supreme Court, "The Due Process Clause 'does not contemplate
that a state may make a binding judgment. . . against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.'" Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216
(1977), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
erty attachment without regard to its role in the litigation," 8 would
institutionalize uncertainty. The laudable judicial interest in sim-
plicity and resolving the merits cannot continue to blur the expanded
due process rights of the defendant, which include exposure to suit
by way of property seizure only upon a related claim.
IV. Conclusion
Shaffer stormed the power-based citadel ofjurisdiction, with the
result that mere presence of property no longer supports jurisdic-
tional attachment." 9 The premise for its single standard triumph
over previous lack of uniformity is that "[i]f a direct assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the Constitution
. . . an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be equally im-
permissible." 2 o
The majority's reservation of issues, which could effectively re-
tain the power principle over a person in the absence of personal
jurisdiction, raises doubt as to the purported interment of unconsti-
tutional means of bringing a defendant before a court. The concur-
ring opinions crystallized this doubt regarding unrelated real
property.
If the power principle is retained under the guise of fairness to
the parties or to forum interests, traditional notions of fair play will
be offended more readily than ever before. Perpetuation of the
traditional quasi in rem remedy, in view of modem commitment to
uniformity, will be inconsistent with the quest for reasonable rather
than power-based contacts. Contemporary mobility and investiga-
tive techniques do not justify jurisdictional attachment of unrelated
real property, which is no more than a direct assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction.
The recently announced minimum contacts test for all asser-
tions of judicial jurisdiction is neither transparent nor unalterable. It
is the skin of a living thought, varying in color and content according
to the times and circumstances. 121 The pervasive rationale of Shaffer
118. Compare Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977) (majority opinion) with id,
at (Powell, J., concurring).
119. This statement does not purport to extend to the judicial law established under admi-
ralty proceedings.
120. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977).
121. This language was used by Justice Holmes to indicate his pervasive approach to con-
struing the Constitution. "A word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and
times in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
necessitates avoidance of ancient forms without contemporary
justification. If fictional minimum contacts are retained from pre-
Shaffer power analysis, the relation to claim concept will be stran-
gled in its infancy by latent judicial reactionism.
